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Virginia Supreme Court has taken the position that the vileness factor
contains terms of common understanding that need no definition. Clark
v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 211 (1979); see also Falkner, The Consti-
tutional Deficiencies of Virginia's "Vileness" Aggravating Factor,
Capital Defense Digest Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 19 (1989).
By motion, objection, and proposed jury instruction, defense
counsel must oppose imposition of the death penalty based on the
vileness factor as currently construed and applied in Virginia.
4. Juror Qualification
Lastly, the court acknowledged that a prospective juror's duty to
serve may be deferred or limited "if serving on a jury... would cause
such a person a particular occupational inconvenience." Va. Code Ann.
§ 8.01-341.2 (1990). In the instant case the court found no errorin seating
the prospective juror because he did not express personal financial
hardship, but instead felt his services were of timely concern to his
employer. Service as a juror is a duty and excuse from jury duty is a
privilege. "The privilege, one the statute makes available at the discre-
tion of the trial court, is purely personal to the prospective juror and
altogether unrelated to the inconvenience suffered by the person's
employer." Mu'Min, 239 Va. at 444-45,389 S.E.2d at 894.
In a related claim by defendant, the Virginia Supreme Court found
that a juror who knew the victim casually could sit as a member of the
jury because she affirmed under oath that she could stand indifferent in
the cause.
Summary and analysis by:
Christopher J. Lonsbury
SMITH v. COMMONWEALTH
239 Va. 243,389 S.E.2d 871 (1990)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On July 24, 1988, Roy Bruce Smith engaged in a gun battle with the
police outside his home inManassas, Virginia. During the shootout, one
police officer was killed. Smith claimed that he did not discharge his
weapon until after he had been shot in the foot by an unknown gunman.
He further claimed that he did not know the victim was a police officer,
or that he had killed anyone during the shooting. Smith said he thought
the police were intruders.
Smith was drunk on the night of the shooting and was reported to have
said he would kill a police officer. In order to attract the police, Smith
began firing a rifle from his front porch. The police arrived and Smith
fled to the back of his home. In the ensuing gunfight, the victim received
multiple wounds, one apparently self-inflicted, and a mortal gunshot
wound to the head fired at very close range. Smith made statements
while struggling with the police that were used to show he knew the
victim was a police officer. The trial court found Smith guilty of capital
murder in the willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of a law
enforcement officer for the purpose of interfering with the performance
of the officer's official duties. Va. Code Ann. 1950 § 18.2-31(6) (1990).
Smith was sentenced to death.
HOLDING
The court held that Virginia's capital murder statute, both as written
and applied, is not unconstitutional. Smith had challenged the capital
murder statute on the grounds that it does not provide an in-depth
analysis in determining whether a sentence of death was imposed under
the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. Several
claims were raised on appeal which were dependent on the particular
facts of the case or were dealt with in a conclusory manner by the
Virginia Supreme Court. These claims are not discussed in this case
summary.
A. Exclusion of Diminished Capacity Evidence
The court decided that the testimony of Smith's psychiatrist was
rightfully excluded. The testimony was in support of a diminished
capacity defense. The court affirmed the trial court's rejection of this
testimony on the ground that it would interfere with the jury's right to
find specific intent. The court relied on Stamper v. Commonwealth, 228
Va. 707 at 717, 324 S.E.2d 682 at 688 (1985), which held "[u]nless an
accused contends that he was beyond (the borderline of insanity) when
he acted, his mental state is immaterial to the issue of specific intent."
Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243 at 259, 389 S.E.2d 871 at 879
(1990). Apparently, in order to establish diminished capacity, a defen-
dant must be prepared to demonstrate that at the time of the crime his
condition was tantamount to that of a clinically insane person.
B. Jury Instructions - Second Degree Murder
Smith argued that an instruction allowing the jury to infer malice
from his deliberate use of a deadly weapon was erroneous. Smith said
this instruction violated Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
Sandstrom forbidsjury instructions from which a reasonablejuror could
derive a mandatory presumption against the defendant for an element of
the offense, or instructions which would allowajuror to presume that the
burden of proof shifts to the defendant. The Smith court, however, ap-
plied the rule in Warlitner v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 348, 228 S.E.2d
698 (1976), which allows ajury to imply malice from the deliberate use
of a deadly weapon. The court reasoned that Warlitner-type instructions
do not constitute a shift of proof or a mandatory presumption against the
defendant that is significant enough to allow a reasonable juror to place
an incorrect burden on the defendant in violation of Sandstrom.
C. Jury Instructions - Premeditation
The court held that an instruction defining premeditation as "specific
intent to kill"was not improper. Smith, 239 Va. at 263,389 S.E.2d at 882.
Smith had offered an instruction equating premeditation with the "de-
sign to kill". The court approved the former instruction but cited with
approval the definition "adopt a specific intent to kill". Id. at 263, 389
S.E.2d 882 (emphasis added). This holding allows the thought process
necessary for premeditated murder to occur simultaneously with the
forming of specific intent, but still describes a process and not simply a
mental state.
D. Victim Impact Statement
The court decided that the submission of a victim impact statement
prepared by the slain officer's widow was not improperly considered by
the trial judge. The victim impact statement was never shown to the jury,
nor did they know of its existence. Smith claimed that because the judge
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must approve the jury's sentence in Virginia, the victim impact state-
ment is improper under Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), which
held that the reading of victim impact statements to sentencing juries
creates an unacceptable risk of arbitrary and capricious sentencing. This
position was reiterated in South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S.Ct. 2207
(1989), which stressed that information concerning the victim not
connected to the crime itself is constitutionally irrelevant in that it does
not bear on the moral culpability of the defendant. The Smith court held
it is within the judge's power to view victim impact statements, based on
the belief that a judge will be able to lay feelings of passion or emotion
aside when deciding whether or not to impose the jury's sentence.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
It should be noted that the court's rejection of diminished capacity
coexists with cases recognizing intoxication as a defense to first degree
murder.Johnson v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 524,115 S.E.2d 673 (1923)
held that someone who was so intoxicated at the time of the murder that
he was unable to premeditate (i.e., adopt a specific design or plan to kill
the victim), cannot be convicted of first degree murder. Fitzgerald v.
Commonwealth, 223 Va. 615,295 S.E.2d 798 (1982), demonstrates this
case law is still valid in Virginia. In Fitzgerald, a capital murder defen-
dant was permitted to advance the diminished capacity/voluntary intoxi-
cation defense and support it with testimony from expert witnesses. The
Virginia Supreme Court said his ability to premeditate was "an issue of
fact to be resolved by the jury". Id. at 632, 295 S.E.2d 807. Smith does
not overrule this line of cases, and both interpretations are currently
within the body of valid state law. Attorneys should continue to avail
themselves of the earlier, more helpful interpretation of premeditation
and diminished capacity/voluntary intoxication defense.
Defense counsel raised a number of issues pretrial and preserved
others during the trial for appellate review. As to other issues, however,
the court found procedural waivers and defaults. Two issues the court
found waived or defaulted illustrate the importance of renewing ob-
jections in some circumstances. An objection to the qualification of a
prospective alternate juror was lost for failure to renew at the time the
jury was empanelled. Another objection concerning the admissibility of
certain testimony of a forensic expert lost because objection was not
renewed after prosecution argued the issue and the witness continued to
testify.
The Sandstrom objection to the court's malice instruction illustrates
the importance of raising even issues that are virtually certain to lose in
state court, and raising them on federal constitutional grounds. See
Avoiding Procedural Default, this issue. In addition, when the Virginia
Supreme Court is forced to rule on federal constitutional matters, it must
address them in the published the record, and this helps the reported
opinions alert other defense counsel to the presence of these issues.
Summary and analysis by:
Peter Hansen
CHENG v. COMMONWEALTH
240 Va. 26,393 S.E.2d 599 (1990)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
A Circuit Court jury in Arlington, Virginia, convicted Dung
Quang Cheng of capital murder pursuant to Virginia Code § 18.2-31 (a)
(now 1) and § 18.2-31(d) (now 4), abduction, robbery, conspiracy to
commit abduction, robbery ormurder, use ofa firearm in the commission
of robbery, abduction, or murder; and possession of a "sawed-off'
shotgun.
On September 3, 1988, Mohamad Amir overheard Dung Cheng
tell two other accomplices that he planned to rob a restaurant. One
accomplice testified that he saw a shotgun in a brown bag at Cheng's
house on September 3rd and had seen Cheng with a pistol the week
before.
All three men went to the Grand Garden Restaurant in McLean,
Virginia which was co-owned by Hsaing "Freddie" Liu. Cheng handed
a note containing his name and telephone number to a receptionist and
directed her to deliver the note to Liu. The men waited for approximately
one-half hour and then departed without seeing Liu.
The next day Cheng informed his accomplices that he again
planned to rob a restaurant. He instructed them to bring a jeep and the
shotgun. The men drove to one of the accomplice's house to pick up a
jeep and then made a brief stop at Cheng's house to allow him to retrieve
a brown bag.
At about 10:00 p.m. that night, Cheng was seen talking to Liu at
the Grand Garden Restaurant. Cheng departed after their brief conver-
sation. At 11:30 Liu, taking his briefcase, left the Grand Garden
Restaurant in his automobile.
The next morning, the Arlington Police discovered Liu's body
between the front and back seat of his car. Liu's hands were tied behind
his back, and he had been shot in the head four times. The police could
find neither Liu's briefcase nor his wallet at the scene of the crime. The
back pocket where Liu usually carried his wallet was untucked.
A police officer testified that the position of the bullet casings led
him to believe that two shots were fired from the front seat, and two were
fired from a position above Liu and outside the vehicle. An autopsy was
performed; however, it was impossible to determine the sequence in
which the shots were fired. The report did note that two of the shots to
the head region were fatal.
The only pieces of evidence found at the scene were a blood
soaked piece of paper containing Cheng's name, address and license
plate number, some cigarettebutts, and an unidentifiedpartial fingerprint.
Two days later, the ArlingtonPolice located Cheng'sjeep in Washington,
D.C. The police impounded the vehicle, seizing a shotgun, a Marlboro
cigarette box, a briefcase and an American Express credit card receipt
signed by Liu.
On September 9th, two days after impounding Cheng's vehicle,
Arlington County Deputy Sheriff, Suwit Yon Kwan, visited Cheng in
jail. Kwan and Cheng had met and become friends six years earlier when
they worked at a restaurant. During their conversation, Cheng stated that
"he didn't do it." Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 393 S.E.2d. 599,
603 (1990). On direct examination, Officer Kwan testified that when
Cheng later expressed his desire to confess, Kwan advised him to speak
with his attorney before making any additional statements. Kwan further
testified that despite this warning Cheng stated that they had no chdice
but to kill Liu because he had a contract out on Cheng. Id. 393 S.E.2d at
608. Furthermore, Cheng stated that the police would not find anything
at the scene of the crime because the only thing that he left was from his
cigarette.
HOLDING
A divided Supreme Court of Virginia held that there was insuffi-
cient evidence that Cheng was in fact the triggerman. Excluding murder-
for-hire, the Virginia legislature has limited the death eligible class of
